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I. INTRODUCTION INTO THE TOPIC
The Treaty of Rome containing the Statute1 of the permanent International 
Criminal Court (ICC) was signed by the State Parties on 17th July 1998. The 
Statute is a great compromise between really different states of the world with truly 
differing interests in order to establish a legitimate international organ of criminal 
jurisdiction to combat international crimes. The Statute as a legal text is result of 
very cumbersome negotiations, and shows that in favour of important moral values 
the consensus could be reached. ʻThe Statute is one of the most complex international 
instruments ever negotiated, a sophisticated web of highly technical provisions drawn 
from comparative criminal law combined with a series of more political propositions 
that touch the very heart of State concerns with their own sovereignty.ʼ2 The Statute 
as a law-product is a reasonable compromise between the known different systems 
of justice – and as every compromise, it has its imperfection, as well. 
The aim of this paper is to show the imperfections concerning an issue, which is 
a small but not a marginal one, is the issue of the Statute of the ICC. The offences 
against the administration of justice are regulated only in one article in the Statute, 
1  See in details SCHABAS (2004), BASSIOUNI (2000, 2003), M. NYITRAI (2006), SATZGER (2002), 
VOGEL (2002), TRIFFTERER (2002)
2  SCHABAS (2004) 25
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but their influence or impacts on the jurisdiction upon the ʻcore crimes  ʼof the ICC 
could be really significant. The paper does not contain a full analysis of this Article 
and the related Rules of Rules of Procedure and Evidence, this task is fulfilled by 
the different Commentaries on the Statute, it focuses only on certain imperfections 
of the regulation. Furthermore it does not treat the parallel provisions of the ICTY 
(ICTR).3
The second part of the paper handles some aspects of the Hungarian 
implementation. These aspects could be mirrored also in other law systems, in 
particular in systems of those State Parties that have comparable legal systems.
II. THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JURISDICTION
The Statute establishes the permanent international criminal court which has 
the right to exercise jurisdiction upon the most serious crimes, upon international 
crimes. The ʻcore crimes  ʼare genocide, crime against humanity and war crimes. All 
three crimes within the ICCʼs jurisdiction are already established in international 
criminal law; the ICC does not set up new crimes but rather embodies the pre-
existing international criminal law. War crimes and crimes against humanity are not 
created as a part of national laws, it is the international community who considers 
them as crimes and their elements are also defined by the international community 
as a consequence. In case of these crimes, criminal responsibility arises directly from 
international law. On the on hand the conviction of a perpetrator of international 
crime does not need domestic legislation in case of acceptance of the responsibility 
arising directly from international law. On the other hand the exercising of the 
national jurisdiction needs sovereign decision of the State because the criminal 
procedure is a manifestation of the national sovereignty. If a State itself brings the 
perpetrator of such a crime to justice it has a duty to prosecute and punish according 
to international law. But the international community has the right to review the 
given national praxis if it is not in conformity with international law. 
The international criminal jurisdiction of the ICC as a whole is based on the 
acquisition of the international (criminal) law and also contains provisions from 
national criminal laws. The punishing power (ius puniendi) of the international 
community to punish works under different conditions and limits from that of the 
States. This characteristic of difference arises from the speciality of the concerned 
crimes (in particular, from the serious danger of these crimes to mankind as a 
whole), and it is the reason why those crimes are excepted from the merely national 
jurisdiction.4 The international prosecution and punishment of the mentioned 
3  See ARBOUR (1998); HARRIS (1998)
4  See Decision of the Hungarian Constitutional Court No. 53 of 1993. IV/3
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crimes can be performed only under guaranties and the scope of human rights, but 
the guaranties cannot be commuted or substituted with the guaranties of national 
criminal law. In this regard, the rules of the ICC may not however be in full 
conformity with the requirements of all national legal systems but they are not 
thereby in conflict with what is called the general part of criminal law of most 
legal systems.5
The national jurisdictions have the priority to prosecute the following international 
crimes: the crimes of genocide, the war crimes and the crimes against humanity. The 
established permanent court can exercise its judicial power derived from the Statute 
only if it is proved that the State has no willingness or ability to investigate and 
prosecute these crimes (the principle of the complementarity)6. It does not supplant 
national courts, it enables the conviction of certain serious crimes in case of the 
failure of national justice, although it is transferred to international level then.
The jurisdiction of the ICC is the delegation of the national powers to prosecute: 
the ICC is an international court but it is not a supranational body and thus, it does 
not embody a foreign court or jurisdiction. It is important for the distinction between 
the concepts of surrender and extradition because the different legal statuses of these 
similar institutions are laid down by the principle of ʻnon-foreign jurisdictionʼ. The 
principle of complementarity constitutes deference to national sovereignty but the 
Statute creates the possibility to prosecute and also to try against the willingness. 
The national sphere is given precedence over the international, unless the national 
sphere is not up to the task.
All in all, the Statute shows that there is no insoluble conflict between the national 
sovereignty and the ICC and it can be the highest form of the international mutual 
co-operation. It serves the protection of the most substantial protecting interests 
and thus could be the most effective, most authentic and fairest trial. It could even 
work if the States itself could not prosecute. The ability of the Court to exercise its 
jurisdiction is provided by the Statute when either the territorial State or the State of 
nationality of the accused is a Party to the Rome Statute (or has consented ad hoc).7
III.  OFFENCES AGAINST THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE OF THE ICC
A. Introduction
Article 70 paragraph 1 of the Rome Statute defines certain offences against the 
administration of the justice of the ICC which must be committed intentionally. 
5  See BASSIOUNI (2000) 15
6  Article 124, Articles 12-13 of the Statute
7  See further BROOMHALL (1999) 45-112
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They are as follows:
(a) Giving false testimony when under an obligation pursuant to Article 
69, paragraph 1, to tell the truth; 
(b) Presenting evidence that the party knows is false or forged; 
(c) Corruptly influencing a witness, obstructing or interfering with 
the attendance or testimony of a witness, retaliating against a witness for 
giving testimony or destroying, tampering with or interfering with the 
collection of evidence;
(d) Impeding, intimidating or corruptly influencing an official of the 
Court for the purpose of forcing or persuading the official not to perform, 
or to perform improperly, his or her duties;
(e) Retaliating against an official of the Court on account of duties 
performed by that or another official;
(f) Soliciting or accepting a bribe as an official of the Court in 
connection with his or her official duties.
These offences are in factual relation with the jurisdiction of the ICC and 
according to this relation it is comprehensible and consequential that the Statute 
itself rules the mentioned crimes. Pursuant to Article 70 paragraph 1, the Court 
shall have jurisdiction over the mentioned offences, but there is no voice about 
complementarity and about the primacy of national jurisdictions for these crimes 
against the administration of justice. Article 70 does not answer the questions how 
and when the ICC could exercise jurisdiction over the same case and whether the 
State Party has right to investigate and prosecute.
Article 70(2) The principles and procedures governing the Courtʼs exercise of 
jurisdiction over offences under this Article shall be those provided for in the Rules 
of Procedure and Evidence. The conditions for providing international co-operation 
to the Court with respect to its proceedings under this Article shall be governed by 
the domestic laws of the requested State.
The Rules of Procedure and Evidence8 (The Rules) elaborated the general 
principles and procedures for the ICC, but not all of the questions are answered 
regarding the mentioned offences.
Under Rule 162 (exercise of jurisdiction) 
1. Before deciding whether to exercise jurisdiction, the Court may 
consult with States Parties that may have jurisdiction over the offence.
8  See the homepage of the International Criminal Court. http://www.icc-cpi.int/
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2. In making a decision whether or not to exercise jurisdiction, the 
Court may consider, in particular:
(a) The availability and effectiveness of prosecution in a State Party
(b) The seriousness of an offence
(c) The possible joinder of charges under Article 70 with charges under 
Articles 5 to 8
(d) The need to expedite proceedings
(e) Links with an ongoing investigation or a trial before the Court, and
(f) Evidentiary considerations.
3. The Court shall give favourable consideration to a request from the 
Host State for a waiver of the power of the Court to exercise jurisdiction 
in cases where the Host State considers such a waiver to be of particular 
importance.
4. If the Court decides not to exercise its jurisdiction, it may request a 
State Party to exercise jurisdiction pursuant to Article 70, paragraph 4.
(Statute) Article 70 4(b) Upon request by the Court, whenever it deems 
it proper, the State Party shall submit the case to its competent authorities 
for the purpose of prosecution. Those authorities shall treat such cases with 
diligence and devote sufficient resources to enable them to be conducted 
effectively.
It is clear from the comparison of the above mentioned provisions that the 
Statute and the Rules establish a primer jurisdiction for the Court in cases of the 
offences against the administration of its justice, and the State Party can exercise its 
jurisdiction only if the Court has decided not to proceed. The latter could be based 
on the Courtʼs own consideration or on the request of the State which otherwise 
has the jurisdiction. The obligation to create a legal background to the national 
investigation and prosecution arises also from Article 70 paragraph 4(b). On the 
one side, this obligation embodies the principle of assimilation, meaning the State 
Parties have to legislate to protect the ICC against such offences. This regulation 
proves the existence of primer jurisdiction of the ICC as well, on the other hand. 
We can recognise thereby an exception to the principle of the complementarity or 
rather this principle cannot affect the offences defined in Article 70.9 The Preamble 
of the Statute (ʻ[e]mphasising that the International Criminal Court established 
under this Statute shall be complementarity to national jurisdictionʼ) underlines the 
complementarity, which is contradictional to Article 70 paragraph 1. It would have 
been less ambiguous not to insist on the elegant unified formulation. 
9  The idea of applying the principle of complementarity to Article 70 was arisen during the pre-
paratory process, but a consensus could not have been reached. See FRIMAN (2001) 609
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The application of the Statute is ruled by Rule 163, which states as a main rule that 
the Statute and the Rules shall apply mutatis mutandis to the Courtʼs investigation 
(prosecution and punishment) but there are many Articles which cannot be applied. It 
means in practice that all provisions of Part 2 (Jurisdiction, Admissibility, Applicable 
Law) shall not apply, the rule of the Applicable Law (Article 21) is an exception and 
the principle of ne bis in idem respecting these offences is laid down in Rule 168. 
The fact that the personal jurisdiction of the ICC does not cover the offender 
under 18 years of age can create a special situation. This disposition can be found in 
Article 26, which must be applied also to the crimes listed in Article 70. It means that 
the ICC has no competence to conduct proceedings against juvenile perpetrators of 
these offences, it is reserved as the sole right to States Parties. It could be mentioned, 
that under-age offenders need special measures and consequently should be dealt 
by the national systems10 which is truly an important aspect to be considered. 
Nevertheless in an extreme case. The non-availability of the juvenile criminal can 
block the effective proceeding of the Court. 
B. The Offences
The definition of crimes in Article 70 paragraph 1 is relatively wide as it includes 
not only the acts committed before the Court and those targeting directly the 
ʻtransparency  ʼof the justice but also several misconduct outside the ʻcourt-roomʼ. It 
creates another difficulty namely that the wording of crimes is not always completely 
exact, so even the further interpretation will not get us closer to the definite content 
of the provision. 
For example, criminal behaviour is the retaliation against a witness or an official 
of the Court or the impediment, the intimidation of an official (Article 70, paragraph 
1d, e). This act can be committed through a variation of actions and it could involve 
many crimes which are neither of similar danger to the protecting interests nor the 
same violation against the protected person. The retaliation against a witness or an 
official can be committed through murder, assault, coercion or blackmail or even 
defamation or other offences against the person. The impediment or intimidation of 
an official is another kind of behaviour which can be committed either without real 
violence (ʻfalse imprisonment  ʼor violation of the personal freedom) or with serious 
violence (for example murder with the specific intent to impede the proceeding). 
The term of ʻofficial of the Court  ʼ (Article 70, paragraph 1d, e, f) is also not 
defined by the Statute, and – despite the expectations11 – the Rules of Procedure 
and Evidence does not regulated this issue. It means, there is no clear limit, as to 
10  FRIMAN (2001) 619
11  See HARRIS (1999) 920
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category of the protected officials. The simple employment by the ICC cannot 
establish such a protection. There should be rather a real connection between the 
judicial work of the ICC and the duties of the concerned official (which are hindered 
by the corruptly influencing, impeding, intimidating or retaliating). Not only the 
exact circle of offenders of paragraph f (ʻsoliciting and accepting a bribe as an 
official of the Court in conjunction with his or her official dutiesʼ) remains obscure, 
but the concerned duties as well, consequently, it is difficult to discover the limits 
to disciplinary responsibility for ʻserious misconduct  ʼ (ʻserious breach of dutyʼ) 
regulated in Rules Rules 23-32.
The ambiguous and wide wording of these offences by the Statute will make the 
national implementation and the extension of the national criminal laws difficult 
or even impossible. The problem lies in the strict requirements of the substantive 
criminal law derived from its general principles in particular from the maxim 
(principle) of nullum crimen sine lege certa (the prohibition of imprecise criminal 
law and sanctions), which expresses an incontrovertible minimum of the respect for 
the principle of autonomy (also said as ʻthe rule of law).12
Furthermore, the Statute does not satisfactory answer the question of who can 
commit the individual crimes, which can lead to the conclusion that beside the 
offender, the witness and the members of the Court even anybody else can exercise 
them. 
If we accept all the above mentioned analysis (the group of punished crimes and 
possible offenders) the behaviours prosecuted according to the Statute will result in 
broad limits, which is not justified enough. The principle background of this kind of 
broad regulation can be the consideration that the mentioned acts are accompanied 
with the core crimes of the Statute, and can hamper or moreover block the conviction 
of the commission of the original crimes. Thereby, those actions shall be declared to 
be punishable as offences against the administration of justice.
The question of the time of commission of the offence is not answered 
either: whether an investigation needs to be commenced at least or, for example, 
the destroying or tampering of evidences can be already committed before any 
investigation or prosecution have been opened? It would lead too far if we supposed 
the latter but it is true that the rules are not definite enough. 
C. The Penalties
Article 70 paragraph 3 laid down only that ʻin the event of conviction, the Court 
may impose a term of imprisonment not exceeding five years, or a fine in accordance 
with the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, or both.ʼ
12  See ASHWORTH (1995) 67; JESCHECK / WEIGEND (1996) 136-137
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The penalty of imprisonment: there is no obligation to impose merely in this 
frame but it serves as a good guide that the maximum penalty is set out in the Statute 
and is not more than 5 years for all of those offences. It should be a main principle 
that different penalties are provided for different types of offences, depending upon 
their seriousness.
The penalty of fine: Rule 166 paragraph 3 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence 
prescribes that
Each offence may be separately fined and those fines may be 
cumulative. Under no circumstances may the total amount exceed 50 per 
cent of the value of the convicted person sʼ identifiable assets, liquid or 
realisable, and property, after deduction of an appropriate amount that 
would satisfy the financial needs of the convicted person and his or her 
dependants. 
As above, the maximum penalties are given by the provisions of ICC but the 
common frame of the punishment of different acts cannot be justified not even 
if this frame serves merely as an orientation. Namely, it is not the same if, for 
example, somebody submits only a false document (as an evidence) or he injures 
the witness or the official of the ICC. The different interests violated by the different 
actions require a protection of different degrees which should be mediated by the 
proportional system of the penalties. Only the different degrees of the protection can 
show the hierarchy of the protecting interests.
Regarding the fine as a possible penalty for the crimes referred to in Article 5 of 
the Statute we can find provisions in Article 77 and in the Rules. Rule 146 paragraph 
2 prescribes the amount of fine penalty and the criteria for its sentencing.
Rule 146(2) (...) Under no circumstances may the total amount exceed 
75 per cent of the value of the convicted person sʼ identifiable assets, liquid 
or realisable, and property, after deduction of an appropriate amount that 
would satisfy the financial needs of the convicted person and his or her 
dependants.
The Rules regarding the offences against the administration of ICCʼs justice 
prohibit also the mutatis mutandis application of the Rules to Article 77 (Rule 
146) and it means that there are no detailed provisions concerning the precise 
preconditions of the imposition of fines (pursuant to Article 70 paragraph 3) in the 
Statute. It is not clear, on the one hand, whether in case of cumulating of crimes, if 
the accused is charged – at the same time – with more crimes, both from Article 5 
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and Article 70 of the Statute, the penalty is a cumulative penalty laid down in Article 
7813, or on the other hand in this case two groups of crimes and punishments are not 
to be combined. In the latter case, it could lead to different substantive rules and 
procedures, which would be questionable concerning the status and rights of the 
accused. 
For the case, if the State itself investigates and prosecutes these crimes, the Statute 
does not contain provisions regarding the applicable penalties. In case of domestic 
jurisdiction, the rules of national criminal law need to be applied. However, this lack 
of a possible common framework could lead to significant differences of applicable 
penalties between the State Parties. 
D. Penal Execution
As a main rule, Part 10 of the Statute (about the penal execution of the penalties 
for the core crimes) is not applicable but there are many provisions which must 
be applied (Articles 103, 107, 109 and 111). It arises from the comparison of the 
applicable exceptions and of the rules which are not to be applied that not the same 
provisions are valid in the enforcement of all sentences taken by the ICC: the rules 
concerning the penalties sentenced for crimes listed in Article 70 are ʻ milder  ʼbecause 
Articles 105, 106 and 110, which would guarantee the domination of the ICC over 
its final judgement, are not to be applied. The Courtʼs exclusive rights include: to 
change the designation of State of enforcement (Article 104); to modify the sentence 
of imprisonment; to decide any application for appeal and revision (Article 105); 
to supervise the enforcement of sentences and conditions of imprisonment (Article 
106) and to review the sentences concerning reduction (Article 110). The limitation 
on the prosecution or punishment of other offences (Article 108) also serves the 
mentioned mitigation, which embodies a stronger power of the States Party over the 
sentences. 
E. The Ways of National Implementations
Pursuant to Article 70 paragraph 4(a)
Each State Party shall extend its criminal laws penalising offences 
against the integrity of its own investigative or judicial process to offences 
13  Article 78(3) – When a person has been convicted of more than one crime, the Court shall pro-
nounce a sentence for each crime and a joint sentence specifying the total period of imprisonment. This 
period shall be no less than the highest individual sentence pronounced and shall not exceed 30 years  ʼ
imprisonment or a sentence of life imprisonment in conformity with Article 77 (1)b.
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against the administration of justice referred to in this Article, committed 
on its territory, or by one of its nationals. 
This paragraph embodies an obligation to amend the national criminal acts. It 
means that the domestic rules of the State Party containing the substantive legal 
conditions to charge individuals must be amended.
The majority of the States Parties will already have Acts that punish the offences 
against their own administration of justice14. In this case, the legislation should 
be purely extended to given persons (accused, witness, official of the ICC) and to 
given acts committed by anybody (influencing a witness, obstructing or interfering 
with the attendance or testimony of a witness, retaliating against a witness for 
giving testimony or destroying, tampering with or interfering with the collection of 
evidence; impeding, intimidating or corruptly influencing an official of the Court 
for the purpose of forcing or persuading the official not to perform, or to perform 
improperly, his or her duties; retaliating against an official of the Court on account 
of duties performed by that or another official). If a State Party does not have any 
legislation concerning the protection of the administration of its own justice it has 
to create a new piece of legislation to comply with the obligation arising from the 
Statute.
Furthermore, the State Party has the duty to enable to proceed for these crimes: 
the legal procedural provisions must be established by legislation if there has not 
been already a possibility to proceed in the national system. The first sentence of 
Article 70 paragraph 4b specifies this obligation formally but at the same time it 
imposes substantial requirements on the processes of the national authorities. These 
shall treat the case with diligence and effectively (whatever the latter should mean), 
but there is no sanction for the case of not meeting these latter requirements. 
F. Summary
All in all, it should be stated that both the ICC and the State Parties can have 
jurisdiction upon the crimes laid down in Article 70. The right of the former to 
prosecute arises directly from the Statute itself, and it is a genuine primer jurisdiction. 
The obligation to establish the adequate substantive and procedural rules of 
jurisdiction of the latter is laid down in Article 70 (if the criminal law of the State did 
not involve the protection of the mentioned interests of any international criminal 
court before). This is the so-called principle of assimilation; the content of which is 
14  See an analysis BORNKAMM: Pressefreiheit und Fairness des Strafverfahrens. Die Grenzen der 
Bericherstattung über schwebende Strafverfahren im englischen, amerikanischen und deutschen Recht. 
(1980) cited by TRIFFTERER (1999) 925.
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already well-known in international law, and nowadays in the European Community 
law. It means, that the State shall penalise the conduct prescribed by the international 
treaty if it has such an offence in its law for domestic cases. This legislation is 
always an extension of existing national rules. Consequently, the principle does not 
oblige States to create ones, if it does not have comparable offences. Even in case 
of an extension, the exercising of the jurisdiction of the State Party depends on the 
request of the ICC, so the State has only an additional jurisdiction in this issue. 
The commission or the suspicion of the mentioned crimes can be recognised both 
by the ICC and the State Party. In the latter case, the State Party has to indicate it 
to the ICC because it is merely the ICC which can decide whether it will proceed 
or not. The State Party has to exercise its jurisdiction if the ICC does not proceed 
or in the case of an offender under the age of 18 because here the State Party 
has the sole right to judge on the matter. If the ICC convicts the perpetrator who 
committed an offence against the administration of justice of the ICC the substantive 
and procedural provisions of the Statute must be applied. 
The penalties sentenced by the ICC – similar to the other penalties pursuant to 
the Statute – must be enforced by the designated State but the national law of the 
State Party has more influence upon the ʻconcrete  ʼ enforcement (for example the 
placement on parole). 
IV. SOME ASPECTS OF NATIONAL IMPLEMENTATION – THE EXAM-
PLE OF HUNGARY
A. In General
Hungary belonged to the group of so-called ʻlike-minded states  ʼ during the 
negotiations and its enthusiasm about the international criminal court did not chilled 
in the following time. Thereby, there is an intention to ratify it in Hungary, but the 
necessary legal steps have not been taken yet. The Hungarian Parliament decided 
on 6th of February 2006 about the confirmation of the Statute in form of an simple 
decision of the Parliament, but it was not followed by the ratification via formal 
act. There are some drafts of the possible legislation, although the controversial 
constitutional interpretations (whether the amendment of the Hungarian Constitution 
is needed or not) blocks the adoption of this formal act.15
The concrete form of the ratification depends on the constitutional rules of the 
State Party, the national constitutions vary in how they incorporate international law 
into domestic law, and States differ consequently in their need for implementing 
15  Nevertheless, the Republic of Hungary already adopted the ratification act of the Agreement on 
the privileges and immunities of the International Criminal Court (Act XXXI of 2006)
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legislation. There we can find three groups of legislative systems – classified 
by BROOMHALL – accordingly: ʻ(a) ratification of the Statute with no changes to 
national law as the international obligation of the Statute automatically become 
part of that law; (b) rudimentary legislation, declaring the substantive law and the 
international co-operation procedures of the Statute to be a part of national law and 
to override any legislation with which they may be incompatible; (c) many systems 
must undertake a review of national legislation to determine the extent to which the 
international instrument requires procedures not provided under or inconsistent with 
national law or the constitution, and must then make appropriate changes to effect 
implementation.ʼ16
In the first step, the legal background of the jurisdiction of the ICC for committed 
crimes by Hungarian nationals or on Hungarian territory will be laid down by 
Hungary. Regarding the substantive rules of the Statute and the compatibility of 
the national legislation with them, there is an important aspect to consider: the 
codification process of the new Hungarian Criminal Code has begun this year and 
one of its aims is to ensure the homogenous ruling of international crimes (according 
to the Geneva Conventions and Rome Statute) in this framework. 
Hungary will follow the general principle of ʻaut dedere aut judicareʼ and, in 
this regard, firstly complies with the obligation of ʻaut dedere  ʼand after the closure 
of this process also the obligation of ʻaut judicareʼ. The whole adoption (class 
[b]) should be effort in the near future, but some new modification are already 
undertaken regarding the Statute and the international criminal courts (see below ʻIn 
Particularʼ). 
Pursuant to Article 4 paragraph 1 of the Hungarian Criminal Code:
Hungarian law shall also be applied to acts committed by non-
Hungarian citizens abroad, if they are (a) criminal acts in accordance with 
Hungarian law and are also punishable in accordance with the law of the 
place of perpetration or (b) criminal acts against the state (Chapter X) with 
the exception of the espionage against allied army, regardless of whether it 
is punishable in accordance with the law of the place of perpetration or (c) 
crimes against humanity (Chapter XI) or any other crime, the prosecution 
of which is prescribed by an international treaty.
From the point of view of the principle nullum crimen sine lege (applying it to 
international crimes) one should distinguish two categories of international crimes, 
namely, crimes against international law and crimes defined in international 
treaties. Criminal responsibility of individuals for crimes against international law 
16  BROOMHALL (1999) 80 and BROOMHALL (1999b) 119
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is based on international law independently from the domestic legal order, while 
criminal responsibility for crimes defined in [international] treaties depends on their 
implementation into domestic legal order.ʼ17 The Hungarian criminal law also punishes 
crimes against humanity, such as war crimes and genocide (Articles 158-165 and 
Article 155 of the Hungarian Criminal Code18). It means that the most punishable 
behaviours by the ICC could be prosecuted by the current provisions being in force. 
The following special aspects of the Hungarian implementation could be quite 
marginal in the view of the general influence of the ICC. However, some special 
problems should be shown by several specific questions that have arisen in the 
process of the Hungarian implementation. 
B. In Particular
B.1. Substantive Criminal Law
In the Hungarian criminal law arose a need to expand the provisions about the 
decisions taken by foreign courts including into this category the international court. 
Pursuant to former Article 6 paragraph 1b of the Hungarian Criminal Code the 
foreign courtʼs decision had the same effect as a Hungarian one, if the foreign court 
has proceeded for the offence which is punishable according to both the Hungarian 
and the foreign law, in addition that the procedure abroad and the imposed sanction 
is in conformity with the Hungarian law. It is the right of the competent national 
court to decide about this conformity. 
In the system of the complementarity, the ICC is not a foreign court, although 
Hungary extended the scope of this legislation in a way, that the law (to Article 6 
paragraph 1b of the Criminal Code) covers all international courts established by an 
international treaty or by the decision of the Security Council of the UN. It means, 
their judgements will be ʻcontrolled  ʼby a national court, if the enforcement of the 
judgement should be realised in Hungary19. 
B.2. Procedural Law20 and International Co-operation in Criminal Matters21
Regarding the procedural provisions, it should be noted that the States Parties are 
generally obliged to ensure that there are procedures available under their national 
17  WIENER (1993) 211 
18  Act IV of 1978 on the Criminal Code
19  The legislator replaced this rule from the Code into the Act on International Co-operation in 
Criminal Matters in 2007, into Article 47 (Act III of 2007).
20  Act XIX of 1998 on the Criminal Procedure
21  Act XXXVIII of 1996 on International Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters
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law for all of the forms of co-operation which are specified under Part 9 (Article 
88) and to co-operate fully with the Court in its investigation (Article 86). This 
general obligation is set out and then applied to arrest, surrender and other forms 
of co-operation. Also they shall, in accordance with the provisions of Part 9 and 
under procedures of national law, comply with requests by the Court to provide the 
assistance in relation to investigations or prosecutions (Article 93). Even so Hungary 
itself does not intend to prosecute at the first place, the Hungarian legal rules must be 
amended to enable the investigation and prosecution by the ICC. In this regard, some 
provisions are amended, for example a new ground is laid down for the suspension 
of the domestic criminal procedure in case of the ICC (or any other international 
criminal court) exercise its jurisdiction, but only if the international criminal court 
requests the transmission of the Hungarian criminal procedure. Furthermore, there 
is a new cause for the termination of the criminal procedure, namely jurisdiction 
exercised by the ICC.
There is a really important distinction between the extradition and the so-called 
surrender in the Statute of Rome. According to Article 102 of it:
For the purposes of this Statute: (a) ʻsurrender  ʼmeans the delivering up 
of a person by a State to the Court, pursuant to this Statute; (b) ʻextradition  ʼ
means the delivering up of a person by one State to another as provided by 
treaty, convention or national legislation.
The differentiation between two similar institutions is a very clever solution 
to avoid several incompatibilities with the different national laws. The material 
requirements of the surrender provided by the Statute are very close to that of the 
extradition because it states that those requirements should not be more burdensome 
than those applicable to requests for extradition between the State and other States 
and should, if possible, be less burdensome, taking into account the distinct nature 
of the Court (Article 91 paragraph 4c).
It needs to be mentioned that the different quality of the institutions exists only 
from the point of view of the ICC or the State because the Court does not exercise 
a foreign jurisdiction. But from the point of view of the offender it is not his own 
state which has the competence over him, in particular, as it is also possible that the 
sentence will be executed in another state. 
The Hungarian legislation contains the obligation to enable the surrender of 
Hungarian nationals and the possible doubts on the real existence of the mentioned 
distinction are not relevant from the point of view of this duty. The Hungarian law 
prohibits only the extradition of nationals to another state (but the Court is not 
another state) but this is ruled merely in an act and not in the constitution. Further, 
the Hungarian Act on International Co-operation in Criminal Matters is subsidiary 
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to international treaties accordingly to the Statute too. Thereby, only the mentioned 
act must have been amended and new provisions shall have been laid down: the 
institution of surrender as a whole must have been newly codified. 
Concerning the enforcement of sentences taken by the ICC, the question arises 
whether the Hungarian State will be ready to enforce the sentences. The present 
legal background allows already the enforcement of these ʻforeign  ʼsentences22 and 
thus, it is rather a financial issue: if the political will holds it necessary and important 
the Hungarian State will indicate its willingness to accept sentenced persons. 
The Statute ensures that the ICC has almost an exclusive right to affect the 
sentence taken by the Court thereby the domestic law of the State of enforcement 
cannot influence it: 
Article 105(1) Subject to conditions which a State may have specified in 
accordance with Article 103, paragraph 1 (b), the sentence of imprisonment 
shall be binding on the States Parties, which shall in no case modify it.
(2) The Court alone shall have the right to decide any application for 
appeal and revision. The State of enforcement shall not impede the making 
of any such application by a sentenced person. 
Article 110(2) The Court alone shall have the right to decide any reduction 
of sentence, and shall rule on the matter after having heard the person. 
If Hungary takes upon the enforcement of sentences of the ICC, supposedly, 
the execution will be realised in its common penal institutions. The imprisonment 
would be executed in the degree of high security23, i.e. in an institution of greatest 
security. The prisoners convicted by the ICC would not have fully the same status 
as the other prisoners as the most important question of whether the sentence will be 
reduced or not is not ruled by the national law but by the ICC Statute and the Rules 
and Procedures of Evidence.
C. With Regard to Article 70 of the Statute of the ICC
As earlier mentioned, the Hungarian ratification occurs in several steps due to the 
pending procedure of codification of the new substantive criminal law. In the first 
22  Article 46 of the Act XXXVIII of 1996 on International Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters
23  Pursuant to Article 41 of the Hungarian Criminal Code ʻ[t]he imprisonment shall be executed 
in an institution for the execution of punishments, in the degrees of high security prison, prison or 
detention centre.ʼ
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step, only the necessary rules will be laid down to enable the proceeding of the ICC 
in an occurrent Hungarian matter. But obligations have arisen from Article 70 of 
the ICC which are of different nature and which bind Hungary (and other Member 
States) to really create new provisions in its substantive criminal law. See some 
characteristic questions below.
C.1. Proportionality of penalties
Article 70 paragraph 3 of the Statute provides that the offences against the 
administration of justice of the ICC foresee a term of imprisonment not exceeding 
five years or a fine or both. This provision, however, binds only the Court when 
it exercises the jurisdiction upon the crimes listed in Article 70 paragraph 1. As 
mentioned, the important question arises whether the national jurisdiction also 
has the duty to concern this ʻmaterial  ʼrule of the Statute or not. It would be very 
dangerous to state that the concerned provisions of the Statute ʻserve as a good 
guideʼ24 to the national legislation because that functions only if we suppose an 
implied obligation within it. But already the MANUAL 2000 explains that this rule 
allows different penalties for different types of offences: the penalty depends upon 
the seriousness of the offences and not upon the provisions of the Statute. Thereby, 
the rules concerning the penalties bind only the Court in its proceeding. There is no 
obligation to punish these offences in the domestic criminal law with the penalties 
of the Statute. 
Furthermore, the Statute does not regulate the applicable penalties, if the State 
itself investigates and prosecutes the offences against the administration of justice of 
the ICC. In this case, the State applies its domestic criminal law with the prescribed 
penalties as well. In both case, of the sole extension of the existing domestic 
provisions or in enacting of new regulation of the offences against the administration 
of justice in the domestic criminal law, the national legislator prescribes the penalties. 
Even if supposed, that the national legislator follows the two aspects of the principle 
of proportionality, that of the proportionality with the seriousness of the offence and 
the proportionality with the whole system of own criminal sanctions, the prescribed 
penalties can be identical but also different from that in the Statute. It means, that 
exercising the national jurisdiction can result different judgements (penalties), 
consequently the judgements depend on the place of trial (either before the ICC or 
before national court).
In that case, if the national penalties are more severe (for example the offence 
against an official under Article 70 of the Statute includes an intentionally murder as 
24  MANUAL (2000) 18
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well), the maximum penalty under the prosecution of the Court would be insufficient, 
the ICC will require the prosecution by the State25. This kind of guided jurisdiction 
embodies a questionable type of forum shopping in criminal matters, which is not 
compatible with the idea and spirit of the international criminal justice established 
by the Statute. 
C.2. Limitation of Offences
Some obscurities are to be found regarding the limitation of this crimes and 
penalties alike. Rule 164 of the RPE states namely that 
(2) Offences defined in Article 70 shall be subject to a period of 
limitation of five years from the date on which the offence was committed 
(...)
(3) Enforcement of sanctions imposed with respect to offences defined 
in Article 70 shall be subject to a period of limitation of 10 years from the 
date on which the sanction has become final (...).
This rule contains the limitation of both criminal responsibility (punishability) 
and punishment. These provisions do not contain obligations to establish the same 
rules into the national law for the States Parties. The relevant rules form part of the 
criminal law. In the Hungarian criminal law, it is part of the substantive law (with 
procedural character too). Article 33 paragraph 1 of the Criminal Code orders that 
the punishability shall be prescribed a) in the case of an offence, which is punishable 
by life imprisonment, by the elapse of twenty years; b) in case of any other crime, by 
the elapse of the period of time equal to the upper limit of the punishment, but not 
less than three years.
Since the very different characters of the crimes penalised by Article 70 of the 
Statute is undoubted – as seen earlier – the similar problem arises concerning the 
limitation. As mentioned, the limitation of the punishability depends on the frame 
of the penalty laid down in the Hungarian Criminal Code. The provisions of the 
limitation bind the ICC, which can only proceed if the questionable period does 
not elapse. But questionable situations can arise if the Statuteʼs provisions upon 
the limitation and the relating national provisions are not in conformity with each 
other, namely the limitation for the same offence is realised on different dates. For 
example, the punishability for the offence is prescribed earlier in the State than that 
according to the Statute. One thing is clear, however, that the unavoidable diversity 
25  HARRIS (1999) 922
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of the national rules which could cause impunity or which are comprised milder 
provisions (for example shorter period of the limitation) would probably be scarcely 
tolerated by the international community.
Generally, it should also be noted that five years as a general rule of the limitation 
according to Rule 164 of the Rules and Procedure of Evidence does not correspond 
to the requirements of the ʻtraditional criminal law  ʼ(supposing that the limitation 
must also be depended on the gravity of the questionable crime). But probably there 
is no need to expect the ICC to have the character of traditional (national) criminal 
law. Still, this consideration could be justified for the jurisdiction upon the core 
crimes but not in any case regarding the offences against the administration of the 
justice of the ICC. 
According to the limitation of the sanctions, this problem also arises because the 
limitationʼs period in the Hungarian law depends on the sentenced penalty:
Article 67(1) The principal penalty shall be prescribed by the elapse of 
a) twenty years in case of imprisonment of fifteen years or a more serious 
punishment, b) fifteen years in case of imprisonment of ten or more years, 
c) ten years in case of imprisonment of five or more years, d) five years 
in case of imprisonment of less then five years, e) three years, in case of 
labour in the public the interest or a fine. 
If the ICC proceeds itself the enforcement of sanctions imposed with respect to 
offences defined in Article 70 shall be subject to a period of limitation of 10 years. 
It means that the limitation of the sanction does not depend on the (gravity of the) 
sentenced penalty. The sentenced fine can also be subject to limitation of 10 years 
(!). 
According to the related Hungarian law, only 5 years as sentenced imprisonment 
prescribes after 10 years, the shorter imprisonment has shorter period of limitation 
(only 5 years) and the limitation of the enforcement of fines is merely three years.
All in all, the offender gains, if he is brought to trial in Hungary.
C.3. How to implement the offences? (Special Part of the Criminal Code)
The national implementation of the provisions laid down in Article 70 will find 
the greatest difficulty in extending the national criminal law upon penalisation of 
the offences or rather in establishing such rules in conformity with the Statute. The 
crimes against the administration of the ICCʼs justice incorporate numerous actions 
– as seen earlier – which are sanctioned usually by national criminal laws but not 
always and anywhere as crimes against ʻthe integrity of its own investigative or 
judicial processʼ.
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There are crimes in Article 70 paragraph 1 which are adequately defined (giving 
false testimony, presentation of false evidence). Here the extension of national 
protection can mean simply that the defined new elements must be penalised 
which hereby supplement the original ones. For example, the special Hungarian 
crimes against the integrity of the administration of justice can be extended for 
the special procedure of the ICC, for the special persons and special objects. 
Also the non-special national crimes against the justice, like bribery, could be 
supplemented with an element regarding the ICCʼs jurisdiction (bribery of witness 
or official). This way of implementation was chosen by the Hungarian legislator 
(Article 249/B, 258/B-258/F).
The common characteristic of these crimes is the adequate definition by the ICC 
and their existence (with the same elements) in the Hungarian criminal law. 
But there is also another group of crimes listed in Article 70 paragraph 1 which 
are not worded strictly enough. It means that they are too general to be a subject 
of national criminal legislation and can thereby contain a lot of different criminal 
behaviours. The obstruction or interference with the attendance or testimony of a 
witness, retaliation against a witness or an official of the Court or interference with 
the collection of evidence or the impediment or intimidation of an official are such 
acts which can be realised by violence, coercion or duress or by breaking of the 
personal freedom or by defamatory oral acts or even by crimes against property and 
also by other crimes. In these cases, there will be almost no problem to prosecute 
because the mentioned crimes are originally penalised by the national criminal law. 
The problem regarding the national implementation arises in situations when the 
committed act does not embody any crime according to the Hungarian (or other 
domestic) criminal law. The obligation of the State Party to legislate switches on 
here, this is the real legal extension to which the State is obliged by Article 70 
paragraph 4a. The Hungarian legislator did not threat this issue, the arisen duty of 
implementation is not – yet – fulfilled. 
C.4. Other Questions
Regarding these crimes and their prosecution (and execution), nearly the same 
implementing provisions must be laid down as concerning the ʻcore crimes  ʼ of 
the Statute but the special characteristic of its ruling requires some supplementary 
approaches. The legislation of implementation must also be concerned inter alia that 
the possibility to surrender must be established and the legal grounds of suspension 
and termination of the domestic criminal procedure must be extended upon the 
ICCʼs proceeding for these crimes. 
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V. SUMMARY
It is indisputable, that the legal characteristic of the offences against the 
administration of the justice in the Statute are different from the core crimes, so 
are the consequences. But the greater flexibility in this legal framework could not 
be justified by the inherent differences of these offences from the ʻcore crimesʼ, 
if it leads to lack of impunity, to difficulties of application and to other legal 
interferences.
